Conference Report: Vigilance in the Republic of Genoa (1400–1800)
The Republic of Genoa was one of two great Italian maritime republics that survived into the Early Modern period (besides Venice). While Venice has been at the centre of scholarly attention for generations, interest in Genoa is not nearly as constant or widespread. This is not the only reason why the conference “Vigilance in the Republic of Genoa (1400-1800) ”, held in Munich on 6–7 February 2026, is noteworthy, but also because the organizers chose an innovative approach: Instead of studying the Republic’s rather weak institutions, they examined the vigilance of private individuals, suggesting that the Republic called on the agency of its subjects to overcome its structural shortcomings.

Within the CRC “Cultures of Vigilance”, the organizers collaborate in project B04 “Against Plague and Corsairs. Averting Danger in Corsica, c. 1650–1800”, which examines vigilance in Early Modern Corsica, then ruled by the Republic of Genoa. Questions of Genoese supra-individual interests were, therefore, central to the conference. At the same time, it examined how the responsibilization of citizens against threats, such as smugglers, corsairs, and epidemics, generated a culture of vigilance, as well as forms of resistance and counter-vigilance. Responsibilization – a concept developed within the CRC – is defined as the transfer of responsibility from originally responsible actors (often institutionalized) to private actors. Finally, the conference participants explored the practical implementation of vigilant practices and the relationship between Genoese objectives and competing supra-individual aims.
Mark Sven Hengerer (Munich) opened the conference with an overview of some key concepts, including coastal vigilance and responsibilization. Leonard Horsch (Munich) then introduced the conference topic in more detail. Using an example from the Bonaparte family, he explained how private actors contributed to the coastal defence against corsairs in Corsica: Napoleon’s ancestor Agostino Bonaparte had financed and constructed a tower near Ajaccio in the late sixteenth century, which furthered public security on the island, while granting him profits from the land surrounding the tower. This case illustrated how – against the backdrop of Genoa’s structural fragility and limited resources – responsibility for security was transferred to citizens. Horsch then outlined the structure of the conference, divided into three sections: the first looked at supra-individual values and incentives, the second concerned vigilance along the Republic’s coastlines, and the third regarded practices of counter-vigilance.
Following the introductory remarks, Davide Ferri (Bern/Florence) opened the conference’s first section with an art-historical presentation. He started with older depictions of Chios and Tabarca, including their coastlines and defensive structures. These islands were owned by private Genoese stock corporations and under constant threat by the Ottomans. Ferri continued, analysing altarpieces in Genoa and Cádiz from around 1650 that depict Genoa and its territories under the auspices of the Madonna, who had been proclaimed Queen of the Republic of Genoa in 1637. By offering an overview of Genoa’s dominions, this political imagery visually suggested the observation of the Republic’s territory with divine help – in other words, a form of territorial vigilance that also referred to a religious justification of the Republic’s political goals. At the same time, pamphlets, such as Giovanni Bernardo Veneroso’s 1650 _Il Genio ligure risvegliato_, propagated this territorial vigilance. Ferri argued, therefore, that the Republic had reached a new stage of self-fashioning by the mid-seventeenth century, designed to assert sovereignty.
Simona Morando (Genoa) offered a literary perspective by examining the works of Gio. Andrea Spinola, a seventeenth-century political writer. After a brief introduction to the author, a Genoese nobleman, she used different examples to show how Spinola tried to convey moral lessons through his works. Focusing especially on “Lo stoico Cristiano” – a treatise from 1680, written for his son – Morando explained how Spinola argued for moral and financial vigilance in aristocratic families. Living a frugal and stoic lifestyle, young aristocrats were supposed to stop squandering their family’s money and concentrate on business activities. This would, in turn, benefit the stability of the Republic because these families formed its collective sovereign. Enhancing one’s vigilance to protect private wealth was, consequently, seen as a way to protect the Republic as a whole.

Céline Dauverd (Boulder, CO) concluded the first section with a paper on Sampiero Corso, a Corsican warlord who attempted to erect a personal signoria in Corsica in the 1550s and 60s. In order to reach his objective, Sampiero had to topple the rule of the Banco di San Giorgio, a Genoese stock corporation, which held control over the island (until 1562). Sampiero garnered widespread support from a variety of powers, such as France, the Ottoman Empire, and their allies in Northern Africa. His willingness to cooperate with both Christian and Muslim rulers illustrates the high degree of Mediterranean interconnectivity and its repercussions on Corsican politics. Using Sampiero as a case study, Dauverd showed how the supra-individual goals of the Corsican warlords – namely, their independence from the Banco – led to the development of their own form of vigilance, deftly exploiting political opportunities beyond the Christian sphere.
Vannina Marchi van Cauwelaert (Corte) opened the second section of the conference with a talk about coastal policing in Corsica under the rule of the Banco di San Giorgio. Before the first coastal towers were built in the 1530s, a network of castles – owned by Corsican warlords – already monitored the coastline. However, these castles were not located directly by the sea but deep in the valleys of the hinterland. After these earlier fortifications had been destroyed by the Banco around 1500 in an effort to curb the power of Corsican warlords, the island was unprotected when barbary pirates constituted a new external threat in the 1530s. The construction of the first coastal towers began, usually at the seaside end of the valleys, in geographical correspondence with the former castles. These new towers were built at the behest of the Banco, often financed by private investors, but initially requested and ultimately paid for by local communities, as their security interests aligned with those of the Banco.
Luca Lo Basso (Genoa) then analysed shipwrecks as critical events in which vigilance, the structural requirements of maritime travel, and individual interests collided. On the one hand, crews and passengers had an existential interest while on board ship and paid attention to how the vessel was run. On the other hand, hierarchies on board were strict, often making vigilance impossible. Comparable problems arose when cargo was stranded on the beaches: subjects were admonished to stay vigilant and not to touch the goods because they could be infectious and – more importantly – belonged to someone else. However, individuals did not respect these supra-individual goals. Lo Basso, thus, showed that Genoese maritime vigilance was neither a uniform nor an all-powerful system. It was a stratified construction, operating on different levels – coast, harbour, market – and producing different effects depending on the context. He argued that it is precisely for this reason that shipwrecks constitute a privileged point of observation for the historian to understand how maritime vigilance functioned.
Paolo Calcagno (Genoa) concluded the second section of the conference with his presentation on sanitary controls along the Republic’s coastlines. He examined the effectiveness of sanitary vigilance, focusing on years in which the danger of contagion was perceived as less acute. An analysis of the correspondence between the Republic’s Office of Health and local governments revealed two key points. Firstly, the proper functioning of the system depended on the activation of three levels: the judiciary, territorial commissioners, and local health officers. Secondly, the Republic affirmed its culture of sanitary vigilance through a clear, unambiguous administrative language. Overall, he argued that a constant level of attention was pursued by the Office of Health during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, even though some letters reveal negligence, pointing to tensions between prescribed vigilance and everyday practice.
Samuele Virga (Verona) opened the third section of the conference with his paper on counter-vigilance within the Genoese galley system. Focusing on Muslim captives used as rowers, he showed how these enslaved men engaged in the smuggling of taxed goods, such as tobacco and liquor. Although tax contractors repeatedly complained about this contraband trade, the practice persisted from the mid-seventeenth century to the 1730s. Virga suggested that this was due to the complicity of the Magistrato delle Galee (Provisores Triremium), whose officials benefited indirectly from these illegal activities. The resulting convergence of interests – i.e. those of the captives and the officials – emerged as an effective form of counter-vigilance, visible in both administrative records and anonymous denunciations.

Francesca Ferrando (Verona) examined contraband in the Republic of Genoa from a gendered perspective, challenging the traditional association with male maritime smugglers. She identified three main strategies of vigilance through the analysis of criminal documentation: intensified controls at gates and markets, the use of complaints and denunciations, and the extension of the category of smuggling to the resale or appropriation of welfare resources, such as bread and flour, by women. Vigilant practices, therefore, extended deep into the very fabric of the urban community. At the same time, women developed counter-strategies, exploiting gender stereotypes, family networks, and institutional loopholes, producing a paradox in which fiscal control efforts generated new forms of solidarity and collusion that undermined their effectiveness.
Erick Miceli (Corte/Genoa) concluded the conference with his presentation on anonymous denunciations in Genoese Corsica. He approached it as not merely a written accusation, but a specific technique and codified practice that revealed a hidden reality, while preserving the writer’s anonymity. Drawing on a range of cases, including denunciations targeting influential families and even agents of the Republic, he showed how such letters enabled citizens of different social status to intervene in political and moral affairs. Consequently, anonymous denunciations became a crucial mechanism through which individuals contributed to a system of vigilance relying upon information from below.
The final discussion stressed the specific situation of the Republic of Genoa. With limited resources, a sparse population, and internal social conflicts, the Republic’s ability to defend its extensive borders appeared unlikely – but it survived. This depended heavily on the responsibilization of its citizens, as the state lacked funding and was structurally weak. It was mentioned that Edoardo Grendi, one of the most prominent Italian historians of the twentieth century, had even claimed that there was no state at all behind the Early Modern Republic of Genoa. In opposition to this, the participants of the conference discussed how Genoa’s “state-like” features become very visible when studying how it coped with a variety of problems, such as piracy, pandemics, contraband trade, and the policing of its extensive land and sea borders through the help of its private subjects. One participant stressed the importance of Genoa’s highly developed information system. Another noted that the Republic was brought to an end by neither uprisings in Liguria nor the large-scale revolt in Corsica (1729–1768). The Republic, instead, succumbed in 1797 to the same external threat (Napoleon’s France) that also terminated its “old rival” Venice – compared to Genoa, a strong state that made intensive use of its resources. All these observations contribute to the image of La Superba as a regime that made efficient use of its limited resources and functioned, when it had to, not relying on costly institutions but calling on its subjects and citizens to stay vigilant. By bringing together perspectives from different fields of research, the conference demonstrated how examining these vigilant practices can open new avenues for understanding governance, security, and social cooperation in Early Modern Mediterranean societies.
OpenEdition schlägt Ihnen vor, diesen Beitrag wie folgt zu zitieren:
Sebastian Menath (5. Mai 2026). Conference Report: Vigilance in the Republic of Genoa (1400–1800). Vigilanzkulturen. Abgerufen am 9. Juni 2026 von https://doi.org/10.58079/166am
